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I. INTRODUCTION

"In my mind, as well as the minds of a lot of other privacy experts, the
Echo has been a ticking constitutional time bomb, along with a lot of other
features of smart homes and the internet of things."' As of June 2016, more
than 1.6 million homes use the Amazon Echo ("Echo"), 2 a device capable
of providing extensive information at the user's command. 3 For instance,
"Alexa," the Echo's personal voice assistant, updates users about the latest
football scores, prepares daily agendas, and may even resolve murders.4 In
November 2016, Bentonville, Arkansas, police officers discovered the dead
body of Victor Collins.5 After conducting an investigation, the police ruled
his death a homicide.6 In Collins' home, police specifically uncovered a
plethora of "smart" devices,7 including an Echo.' Police seized the Echo and
served Amazon with a warrant alleging that Amazon held records related to
Collins' murder.9 Although requesting this data seemingly imposes an
uncomfortable burden on the Echo user's right to privacy,'o little data is
1. Iman Smith, Amazon Releases Echo Data in Murder Case, Dropping First
Amendment Argument, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Mar. 8, 2017, 2:38 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/amazon-releases-echo-data-murder-casedropping-first-amendment-argument/ (quoting Carrie Leonetti, Associate Law
Professor, Criminal and Constitutional Law, University of Oregon).
2. BI Intelligence, How Many Amazon Echo Smart Home Devices Have Been
Installed?, Bus. INSIDER (June 7, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/howmany-amazon-echo-smart-home-devices-have-been-installed-2016-6.
3. Grant Clauser, What Is Alexa? What Is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get
One?, WIRECUTTER, http://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazon
-echo-and-should-you-get-one (last updated Sept. 5, 2017) (identifying Amazon's
Alexa-controlled Echo speaker as a speaker capable of using only voice command,
searching the Web, controlling household appliances like dimming the lights, and
communicating with third-party services, all while never having to interact with a
screen).
4. See Amy B. Wang, Can Alexa Help Solve a Murder? Police Think So - but
Amazon Won't Give Up Her Data., WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/20 16/12/28/can-alexa-help-solve-a-murder-policethink-so-but-amazon-wont-give-up-her-data/?utmterm=. 1920722036a9. See generally
Britta O'Boyle, Amazon Echo: What CanAlexa Do and What Services Are Compatible?,
POCKET-LINT (July 10, 2017), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/138846-amazon-echowhat-can-alexa-do-and-what-services-are-compatible (providing details on the Echo's
capabilities).
5. See Wang, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Smart Device, TECHNOPEDIA (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/31463/smart-device (defining a smart device as "[a]n electronic gadget that is
able to connect, share and interact with its user and other smart devices").
8. See Wang, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. See Russell Brandom, How Much Can Police Find Out from a Murderer's
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stored on the actual device. Rather, most of the data is stored on the Internet
and/or smart phones by way of the user's Amazon account." Nonetheless,
the recordings are time stamped, thereby providing the police or government
officials insight into a person's statements and/or general presence within a
particular space.' 2
The debate over data accessibility, namely what government agents should
access and how they can access such data emerges when courts are forced to
resolve conflicts between one's right to privacy and society's reliance on
electronic communication. For instance, between 2015 and 2016, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") requested that Apple Inc. ("Apple")
provide an all-access key to investigate iPhone-stored data, including the
data stored on the iPhone owned and operated by Syed Rizwan Farook and
Tashfeen Malik, the married couple responsible for the San Bernardino
shootingl 3-Apple refused.1 4 Jeffrey Bezos, Amazon's Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO"), aligned with Apple, noting that consumer privacy is a
highly important issue and that the conflict between privacy and national
security is an "issue of our age."'1 "Privacy" is integral to the consumerretailer relationship.1 6 Specifically, should consumers believe that their
information is private, they are more inclined to purchase goods that advance
said privacy." If, however, consumers believe that their information is
Echo?, VERGE (Jan. 6, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2017/1/6/14189384/
amazon-echo-murder-evidence-surveillance-data.
11. See id.; see also Mehau Kulyk, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say.
But What Happens to that Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.
com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-your-voice/ (demonstrating how the Echo constantly "listens" for commands, then records and streams the clip of what the user says
to their account on either the Internet or phone, storing data on the user's Amazon
account until he or she decides to delete it).
12. See Brandom, supra note 10.
13. See Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC, (Mar. 29, 2016,
6:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html.
14. See id.
15. See Hayley Tsukayama, Amazon CEO Jeffrey Bezos: Debate Between Privacy
and Security Is 'Issue of Our Age', WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/05/18/amazon-ceo-jeffrey-bezos-debatebetween-privacy-and-security-is-issue-of-ourage/?tid=ainl&utm term=.54e4e0fl ab9 1.
16. See also Walter Loeb, Privacy and Consumer Faith on Retailers' 2014 List of
Worries, FORBES, (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb
/2014/01/1 7/the-top-two-worries-retailers-have-right-now/#2e7456db 1 adf (identifying
consumers' privacy as one of the paramount responsibilities of the retailer).
17. See Andrew Meola, How the Internet of Things Will Affect Security & Privacy,
BUS. INSIDER, (Dec. 19, 2016, 2:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-ofthings-security-privacy-20 16-8 (pointing to consumers' higher levels of privacy
concerns as a source of hesitation to purchase items).
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freely accessible to third parties, including the government, they hesitate to
purchase goods."
This Comment will begin by reviewing the jurisprudence surrounding the
search and seizure of electronic data under the Fourth Amendment, the thirdparty doctrine, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), and
the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"). This discussion requires an
understanding of search and seizure law as applied to both people and
intangible items, such as data on electronic storage units, and also how search
and seizure law has evolved to envelope data stored on electronic mediums.
Part III will analyze the case law surrounding electronically stored data and
will apply said law to the Echo's recording process. In doing so, this
Comment will reveal the outdated nature of the SCA, and further expose
government officials' overreliance on the third-party doctrine. Part IV will
additionally recommend that the SCA be appropriately modified and that the
third-party doctrine be expanded to include a categorization requirement to
best meet the consumers' privacy needs and business' desire to sell. Part V
concludes by summarizing the necessary changes to current legal standards
to ensure privacy while also upholding the appropriate legal standard.
II. THE LAWS IMPLICATING ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC DATA

A.

The FourthAmendment

'

Although the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment to protect people, not places, from unreasonable searches and
seizures,' 9 the language of the Fourth Amendment ostensibly contemplates
only physical searches and seizures.20 The Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is thus the starting point in any Fourth Amendment analysis,
as it identifies what categories of information should be protected and how
to guarantee enforcement of that protection.2
18. See Elliot C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You Help with this Murder
Case?, CNN, (Dec. 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/tech/amazon("It is unreasonable to expect
echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case-tmd/
consumers to monitor their every word in front of their home electronics. It is also
genuinely creepy.").

19. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that Fourth
Amendment protections apply to people, not places).

20. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (emphasis added) ("The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.").
21. See Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protectionsfor Electronic Communications: The
Stored CommunicationsAct and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 35152 (2009) (surmising that the Framers could neither anticipate technology, nor the
concept of online communications, and how courts' have tried to expand the Fourth
Amendment to protect privacy rights in an increasingly technological world).
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The intersection between the Fourth Amendment and technology first
emerged in Olmstead v. United States. 22 In this case, the Court determined
that wiretapping did not constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment even when the government wire-tapped Olmstead's phones. 23
Approximately thirty years later, the Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v.
United States. 24 In Katz, the Government wire-tapped a public phone booth
and introduced statements acquired therein as evidence against Katz.2 5
Rather than following Olmstead, the Court determined that even if there is
no physical invasion on one's privacy, the Fourth Amendment proscribes
unlawful non-physical invasions of privacy committed by the government. 2 6
In its analysis, the Court established a two-step test for Fourth Amendment
cases. 2 7 The test requires courts to evaluate whether the individual alleging
harm maintained a reasonable or subjective expectation of privacy given the
circumstances and whether society, as a whole, is prepared to recognize the
individual's expectation of privacy as reasonable. 28 Additionally, the Court
expanded the Fourth Amendment's protections to the curtilage of a person's
home.29 Curtilage breaks down into three factors: (1) a connection with the
home; (2) the proximity a court would regard as curtilage of the home
(regardless of the home's enclosure); and (3) use of the space for private or
personal means.30 In one such case, police used drug-sniffing dogs to search
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928) (presiding over a case about
agents wiretapping one's private telephone conversation).
23. See generally id. at 466 (explaining that evidence obtained by virtue of wiretapping should not be protected because it was not a physical search or seizure as
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment).
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that a person's expectation
of privacy is violated, even in a public phonebooth, where the government wiretaps his
personal conversation).
25. Id. at 348.
26. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A]n enclosed telephone booth is an area
where, like a home ...

and unlike a field ...

a person has a constitutionally protected

reasonable expectation of privacy . .. [and] that electronic as well as physical intrusion
into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.").
27. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. Id. (noting that a person must first demonstrated an actual expectation of privacy
and also that society recognizes said expectation as reasonable); see also Ann K.
Wooster, Expecation of Privacy in and Discovery of Social Networking Web Site
Postings and Communications, 88 A.L.R.6th 319 (highlighting the case law governing
expectations of privacy with respect to different types of Internet communications).
29. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 180 (1984)) (defining "curtilage" as "the area 'immediately surrounding and
associated with the home' and acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment protects the
curtilage).
30. See id.
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the curtilage of a suspected dealer's home.3' The suspected dealer claimed
that the search of the area around his home, while not inside the home, still
warranted Fourth Amendment protection because it was unreasonable-the
Court agreed.32 Additionally, the concept of "curtilage" can be expanded to
include what Andrew Guthrie Ferguson calls "digital curtilage" or the area
in which data and stored communications exist.33 The concept of digital
curtilage enhances consumers' reasonable expectations of privacy with
respect to the varied technology in their homes.34 Given the Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, constitutionally-protected
individuals can withdraw to their home, wherein they maintain a heightened
expectation of privacy from unreasonable government intrusion.35 Without
this protection, police could stand directly outside a suspected criminal's
window, lurking about for evidence.3 6
The scope of the Fourth Amendment, or more precisely the Court's
interpretation of its protections, expanded as technology has evolved.
Specifically, in Kyllo v. United States,3 7 police aimed a thermal-imaging
device at the petitioner's home.3 8 The Court found that this constituted an
unreasonable search because the thermal-imaging device explores details of
a home in a manner not unlike a physical intrusion, and that the device itself
is one not typically available to the public.39 Kyllo clearly demonstrates the
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 4, 8 ("As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and
all four of their companion's firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension
of Jardines' home, the only questions is whether he had given his leave . . . for them to
do so. He had not.").
33. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internetof Things and the FourthAmendment of
Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 809 (2016) (proposing the theory of "digital curtilage" to
protect electronic data that "(1) [is] closely associated with the effect; (2) [has] been
marked out and claimed as secure from others; and (3) [is] used to promote personal
autonomy, family, self-expression, and association").
34. See id. at 866 (describing the need for heightened expectations of privacy with
respect to evolving technologies).
35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(equating a public phonebooth to one's home, where the expectation of privacy reaches
its apogee); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (noting "the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion").
36. See Jardines, 560 U.S. at 6 (explaining that without some protection around
one's home, the right to withdraw would be rendered useless as police could simply stand
outside one's window).
37. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 29 (2001).
38. See id. at 29 (noting that the case involved a thermal-imaging device utilized to
detect the amount of heat within the defendant's home).
39. Id. at 34 ("[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
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Court's willingness to expand Fourth Amendment protections in conjunction
with evolving technology. 40
Notwithstanding the Court's willingness to expand Fourth Amendment
protections to ever-evolving technologies, the question remains: will the
Court protect the user's right to privacy when the Government introduces
evidence acquired from stored data communications devices, such as the
Echo? By way of background, the Echo is a home audio speaker that
responds to the name "Alexa", the Echo's personal voice assistant.4 ' The
Echo constantly listens for sound, connects to the user's Wi-Fi and home
network, accesses cloud services, and uses Bluetooth streaming
technology. 42 As indicated earlier, most of the Echo's data is stored on the
user's Amazon account. 43 For police to access the Echo's data transmitted
to a user's Amazon account, the data itself must be intercepted from the
wireless network in which the Echo operates.4 4 The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California attempted to resolve this issue in In re
Google Inc. Street View Electronic CommunicationsLitigation.4 5 Here, the
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit upon learning that Google Street View 4 6 accessed
their wireless communications through Wi-Fi networks and obtained
information from their respective computers allegedly in violation of the
1968 Wiretap Act ("Wiretap Act"). 4 7 The court attempted to determine
whether the Wiretap Act, at the time it was enacted, encompassed the

'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' . . . constitutes a search-at least
where .

.

. the technology in question is not in general public use.").

40. See generally id. (concluding that the Fourth Amendment protects against
warrantless invasions of a person's home utilizing advanced technology not readily
available to the public).
41. Marie Black, What Is Amazon Echo?, TECH ADVISOR (Sept. 28, 2017), http://
www.pcadvisor.co.uk/new-product/audio/what-is-amazon-echo-3584881/.
42. Id. (explaining that the Echo functions upon hearing the user say, "Alexa", at
which point the Echo awakes and listens for the user's specific commands).
43. See Brandom, supra note 10.
44. See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1082 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (discussing the use of technology to intercept wireless
transmissions).
45. See generally id. (finding that the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to claim a
violation of the Wiretap Act where the defendant (Google) created, approved of, and
implemented a highly-technical design software into Google Street View vehicles to
intercept plaintiffs' "data packets").
46. See id. at 1070-71 (describing Google Street View as a feature within Google
Maps offering various positions and views using photos taken from "a fleet of specially
adapted vehicles commonly known as Google Street View vehicles").
47. Id. at 1070-72 (noting that Google intentionally implemented a data collection
system on Google Street View vehicles).
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concept of Wi-Fi. 48 The court concluded that when Congress enacted the
Wiretap Act, it did not contemplate the concept of Wi-Fi.49 Specifically, the
court determined that the Wiretap Act's definition of "radio
communications" should not be expanded to include Wi-Fi.so As such, the
court explored the legislative intent behind radio communications,
concluding that "interpreting 'radio communication' broadly would
contravene congressional intent to provide protection for technology like
cellular phones, which use radio waves to transmit communications, but are
architected in such a way as to be private.""
B.

The Third-PartyDoctrine

The third-party doctrine permits the government to collect "any
information given to a third party by a criminal suspect, without running
afoul of the Fourth Amendment." 5 2 In establishing the third-party doctrine,
the Court acknowledged that an individual's expectation of privacy is
diminished when private information is shared with a third party.53 In United
States v. Jones,5 4 however, the Court recognized that the third-party doctrine
could not be maintained in its current form; yet the Court offered no
alternative." In particular, Justice Sonya Sotomayor said "[i]t may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties."56

48. See id. at 1082 (explaining that although the plaintiffs' Wi-Fi network was
organized such that the public could access it and transmit electronic communications,
the network was set up to protect those transmissions absent the use of advanced
technology (i.e., the technology used by Google), and thus, the Wiretap Act applied).
49. See id. at 1076 (stating that "[t]he drafting of [ECPA] provisions predated the
spread of wireless internet technologies").
50. See id. ("[T]he usage of 'radio communication' throughout the [ECPA] does not
lend itself to a broad interpretation of the term.").
51. Id. at 1081.
52. See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REv. 985, 985 (2016).
53. See Scolnik, supra note 21, at 354 (explaining that the Supreme Court believes
people have a reduced expectation of privacy when items/information is voluntarily
exposed to "public view").
54. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
55. See id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the third-party doctrine is
"ill suited [sic] to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks"); see also id. at
413 (finding that the FBI, which placed a Global Positioning System ("GPS") on Jones's
car to track his movements, violated the Fourth Amendment).
56. See id. at 417.
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The scope of the third-party doctrine was refined in Riley v. California.17
In this case, the Court refused to extend the Fourth Amendment's search
incident to arrest exception" to a cellphone.5 Although the Government
argued that cellphones are "materially indistinguishable" from certain items,
such as wallets or purses, the comparison did not persuade the Court.6 0 In
fact, the Court explicitly stated that the cellphone, albeit a modern device,
"implicate[s] privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search
of... a wallet, or a purse." 6 1 With respect to the third-party doctrine, the
Government and California simultaneously argued that information on cell
phones can be destroyed by remote wiping conducted by third parties, a
process in which "a phone, connected to a wireless network, receives a signal
that erases stored data." 62 While the Court acknowledged the possibility of
third parties destroying data remotely, it nonetheless determined that said
third parties should be of little concern because they are not present at the
scene of the arrest. 63 As such, Riley represents the Court's willingness to
protect electronic communications vulnerable to third-party destruction.
Additionally, in UnitedStates v. Warshak,6 4 government agents compelled
an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") 65 to share a defendant's incriminating
emails without first obtaining a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.66
Instead, the agents relied on the SCA, which permits government agents to
obtain emails otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.6 7 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the SCA provides

57. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
58. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381 (2001) (affording police the power to
search anyone subsequent to that individual's arrest without first obtaining a search
warrant from a neutral magistrate).
59. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2494-95 ("[T]he search incident to arrest exception does not
apply to cell phones .... .").
60. See id. at 2488-89 (differentiating between physical items on the arrestee's
person and digital data, noting that cell phones "differ in both a quantitative and
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person").
61. Id. at 2489.
62. Id. at 2486.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
65. See Internet Service Provider (ISP): What Exactly Does an Internet Service
Provider Do?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/intemet-service-provider-isp-262
5924 (last updated Dec. 1, 2017) ("Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) is the company
you pay a fee to for access to the internet.").
66. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 266.
67. See generally id. (finding that the government violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, but relied in good-faith on the SCA).
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three options for the government to acquire communications stored with a
service provider: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) utilize administrative subpoenas;
or (3) acquire court orders under section 2703(d). 68 Regardless, the court
concluded that the similarities between email and traditional forms of
communication justifies expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment to
protect email correspondence containing "confidential communications. "69
Although the third-party doctrine is certainly implicated in the context of
remotely stored electronic communications, the court determined that "the
mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a
communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation
of privacy. "70 Additionally, the court held that the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule did not apply because the government relied on the good
faith exception7 listed in sections 2703(b) and 2703(d) of the SCA. 72
C.

The Electronic CommunicationsPrivacy Act and the Stored
CommunicationsAct

The Wiretap Act enabled Government officials to intercept electronic
communications in several circumstances, including those made during (1)
the ordinary course of business for common carriers, or those (2)
interceptions assisting permitted law enforcement investigations. 73 The
Wiretap Act also allowed persons acting as government agents under the law
to intercept communications with one party's consent.74 As computer
systems became more affordable, more individuals had access to electronic
forms of communication, such as email. 5 Concerned that existing laws did
68. See id. at 283.
69. Id. at 285-86, 288.
70. Id. at 286. But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (noting that
the "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities").
71. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (finding that evidence
should not be barred from admission when the evidence seized was done so reasonably
based on a good faith reliance on a search warrant that was subsequently found
defective).
72. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 292 (noting that the government violated the Fourth
Amendment, but properly relied upon the SCA's good faith exception).
73. See Amy McCann Roller, Note, From Ship-to-Shore Telegraphs to Wi-Fi
Packets: Using Section 705(a) to Protect Wireless Communications, 68 FED. COMMS.
L.J. 525, 534 (2016) (explaining that the Wiretap Act permits interceptions in certain
instances).
74. Id. ("[The Wiretap Act] allowed persons acting under the color of law to intercept
communications with one party's consent.").
75. Melissa Medina, Note, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for
Modern Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (2013) (stating that manufacturers,
including IBM and Apple, released more cost-effective computers, thereby initiating the
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not adequately protect the privacy of a citizen's electronic communication,
Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986.76 Title II of the ECPA encompasses
the SCA," which protects electronic communications." The ECPA and
SCA, further govern and define two types of service providers, respectively:
electronic communication services ("ECS")79 and remote computing
services ("RCS").so The application of the SCA to a particular case depends
on whether electronic communication can be classified as an ECS or RCS,
specifically in the context of liability."
1.

ECS

The term "ECS" refers to a service providing its users the ability to receive
and transmit electronic communications.8 2 The SCA proscribes ECS
providers from divulging information contained within its electronic
storage.83 Courts have struggled to adopt a uniform definition for ECS

"creation of novel and now widely used methods of communication").
76. Id. at 269.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012); see also Medina, supra note 75, at 269 (noting
that Congress passed the SCA as part of the ECPA).
78. See Medina, supra note 75, at 269 (explaining that the SCA protects electronic
communications by providing a private cause of action against anyone who acquires
stored communications, and regulating when service providers can disclose user
communication).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (defining ECS as "any wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photooptical [sic] or photoelectronic [sic] facilities for the transmission of wire or
electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment
for the electronic storage of such communications").
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining RCS as "the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system").
81. See Medina, supra note 75, at 278-79 ("[T]he scope of the SCA depends on
whether an electronic communication is held by an ECS or RCS provider and whether
the communication is in electronic storage.").
82. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that under the SCA, ECS providers enable users to receive and
transmit wire or electronic communications).
83. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)) (noting that ECS providers may not "knowingly
divulg[e] to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)-(B) (defining electronic
storage as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of such communication
by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication").
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providers.84 InKonop v. HawaiianAirlines, Inc.," the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a secure website was an ECS because
when users viewed the website and initiated electronic communication, said
communication was sent from the website owner to the users. 86
Additionally, the court determined that once the user has access to the
website through which the data is transmitted, the website qualifies as an
ECS." Further, in Kaufman v. Nest Seekers, LLC, " the plaintiff brought a

lawsuit under Title II of the ECPA (i.e., the SCA), alleging unlawful access
to stored communications on a website that purportedly acted as an ECS. 89
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded
that the website at issue, which acted like an electronic bulletin board,90
facilitated electronic communication as an ECS provider.9' Although the
court determined that it was "premature" to find the website, at the pleadings
stage, to be an ECS provider, it nonetheless concluded that a website
permitting users to engage "in private electronic communications with thirdparties" may act as an ECS provider.92
Conversely, in UnitedStates v. Steiger,93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the SCA did not apply to a home computer
because it did not operate like an ECS provider.9 4 As the court indicated, the
"SCA . . generally prohibits an entity providing an [ECS] to the public from
disclosing information absent an applicable exception," but in this case,
Steiger's home computer did not provide an ECS for which the SCA could
84. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002)
(qualifying Konop's secure website bulletins as an ECS), with In re JetBlue, 379 F. Supp.
2d at 308-09 (explaining that JetBlue's website, alone, could not make the company an

ECS provider).
85. Konop, 302 F.3d at 879 (explaining that the website at-issue is an ECS provider).
86. See id. at 874-75 (explaining that the Inter enables users to exchange electronic
communication worldwide, and that websites, like Konop's, receives, transmits, and
stores electronic communications akin to an ECS provider).

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 875-76 (defining and concluding Konop's website as an ECS).
No. 05-CV-6782 (GBD), 2006 WL 2807177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 417 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990))

("A[n] [electronic bulletin board] system is a computer program that simulates an actual
bulletin board by allowing computer users who access a particular computer to post
messages, read existing messages, and delete messages.").
91. See id. at *5 ("An electronic bulletin board fits within the definition of an
electronic communication service provider.").
92. See id. at *6 (acknowledging that an on-line business, like the one at-issue, that
allows users to receive and transmit electronic communications acts as an ECS provider).

93. 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003).
94. Id. at 1049 (noting that there is "no evidence to suggest that Steiger's computer
maintained any 'electronic communication service').
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apply.95 Additionally, in In re JetBlue Airways Corp. PrivacyLitigation, the
U.S District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that
JetBlue Airways Corporation ("JetBlue"), which operated a website enabling
it to communicate with customers in the ordinary course of business, did not
automatically transform into an ECS provider by virtue of operating that type
of website.9 6 Even though JetBlue controlled the website in-question, the
court found that JetBlue was never the provider of electronic communication
services as contemplated by the SCA because it did not allow information to
be transmitted over the Internet.9 7 As such, the information disclosed did not
violate the law.98 Likewise, in Crowley v. CyberSource Corp.,99 the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California determined that
Amazon's website did not qualify as an ECS.'0 0 Crowley sued Amazon after
it divulged Crowley's personal information to CyberSource Corporation to
verify Crowley's credit card information.' 0 ' In assessing Amazon's liability
for improper disclosure under section 2702(a)(1),1 02 the court determined
that Amazon must have "provide[d] either electronic communication service
or remote computing service."'0 3 Although Amazon received emails from
Crowley, the court held that it was not an ECS.1 04 The court further noted
that to hold otherwise would make the ECS definition over inclusive,
unnecessarily equating users with providers-a distinction explicitly

95. Id. (explaining that the SCA does not apply in this case, but that the SCA may
apply "to the extent the source accessed and retrieved any information stored with
Steiger's Internet service provider").
96. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that JetBlue controls a website that enables the receipt and
transmission of electronic communications, but in a manner not akin to an ECS provider).
97. See id. ("Rather, JetBlue is more appropriately characterized as a provider of air
travel services and a consumer of electronic communication services.").
98. See id. at 306-07 (noting that JetBlue's Passenger Reservation System was
merely a website operated by JetBlue and did not convert JetBlue into an ECS provider);
see also Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding
the website at-issue to be user of, rather than a provider of ECS).
99. 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
100. See id. at 1270 (noting that Amazon, which receives emails from users, is not an
ECS provider as contemplated by the SCA).
101. See id. at 1265 (alleging that Amazon shared identifiable information without
consent to a third party after a user purchased goods through Amazon's website).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012) ("[A] person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity
the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.").
103. Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
104. Id. (noting that to hold Amazon as an ECS provider would unnecessarily equate
a "user with a provider" in conflict with the SCA).
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referenced in section 270 1(c) of the ECPA.'0 o
2.

RCS

To qualify as an RCS, the provider's electronic storage must be available
to the public through an electronic communications system, meaning "any
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical [sic] or photoelectronic facilities
for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer
facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications."1 0 6 Loosely put, an RCS is maintained through another
computer, which stores and processes data subject to future retrieval. 0 7 The
term "electronic communication"
encompasses many forms of
communication, including signs, signals, images, and data by wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical system affecting interstate
or foreign commerce;'0 o however, Wi-Fi does not appear in section 2510(12)
of the ECPA. Unlike ECS providers, the SCA prevents RCS providers from
disclosing any communication carried or maintained by the provider for the
sole purpose of storage or computer processing services. 09 Additionally,
should the provider's services remain available only to a select few, not the
public at-large, courts are reluctant to find liability based on the provider's
existence as an RCS." 0 In fact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois determined that an internal email system available only to
select staffers, or those with a special relationship to the provider, constituted
a system restricted to the community at-large and, thus, the provider was not

105. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (defining providers and users in separate
subsections).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) ("[T]he provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system."); see also ECPA
Definitions, CYBER TELECOM, http://www.cybertelecom.org/security/ecpanutshell.htm
(last updated Mar. 1, 2017, 11:21 PM).
107. See generally S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986) (delineating opinions and understandings regarding information under the ECPA).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12); see also United States v. Herring, 993 F.2d 784, 787
(llth Cir. 1993) (suggesting that "electronic communication" is a broad, all-encompassing term).
109. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (noting that RCS providers cannot disclose information it receives, maintains, or
stores, if the RCS provider is not permitted to access "the contents of [the]
communications for purposes of providing . . . services other than storage or computer
processing").
110. See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(indicating that gaining access to an internal email system does not fall under the
statutory definition of "to the public" because the individual who gained access was not
"any member of the community at large").
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"

an RCS under the ECPA/SCA.

III. THE ECHO UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT, THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE,

AND ECPA/SCA JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Accessing Data on the Echo Using the FourthAmendment and the
Third-PartyDoctrine

Government agents seeking to intercept or access data stored on the Echo
without a warrant do so in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment.11 2 As
such, agents conducting warrantless searches with respect to data must
demonstrate that one of the Fourth Amendment's exceptions, such as the
third-party doctrine, apply." 3 Compelling disclosure of data stored on the
Echo, specifically electronic communications reasonably transmitted in
confidence, violates that user's subjective expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.1 4
Applying the Court's analysis in Katz to
governmental searches involving the Echo, it becomes evident that in
conducting searches, even those touching only electronic communications,
agents must satisfy the two-step test announced in Katz."' To that end, the
Echo user maintains an expectation of privacy because his relationship with
the device itself, including each Echo-specific command, presumably occurs
in the confines of his home, wherein he maintains a heightened expectation
of privacy.11 6 While the user's interaction with the Echo unlikely involves

111. Id. at 1043 (concluding that the plaintiff acted as the defendant's employee rather
than a member of the community at-large, and further, the mere fact that the email server
could communicate with the public did not transform the defendant into an ECS
provider).

112. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(explaining that warrantless governmental searches in constitutionally protected areas
are "presumptively unreasonable").
113. See id. at 362 (noting that warrants are generally required, but agents can
nevertheless conduct warrantless searches when one of the Fourth Amendment's
exceptions apply).
114. See Medina, supra note 75, at 294-95 (noting that Fourth Amendment privacy
protections focus on necessity and expectation, and that electronic communications

should be similarly analyzed).
115. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (clarifying the Court's two-prong
inquiry for searches, noting that the first prong focuses on the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy, and that the second prong addresses whether society accepts the
individual's expectation as reasonable).
116. See id. at 360 (implying that the home is a place, albeit the most important place,
where individuals maintain the most constitutionally protected expectation of privacy);
see also Ferguson, supra note 33, at 837 ("The Fourth Amendment protects houses and
effects . . . [and] [i]f police entered the house without a warrant, you would have a
physical invasion of the home.").
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the consistent dissemination of highly-confidential or revealing information,
the user, who is more likely to confide intimate details of his life in his own
home, might nevertheless disclose confidential information to the Echo that
is protected by the Fourth Amendment." 7 Furthermore, the user's subjective
expectation of privacy when interacting with the Echo is likely one that
society deems reasonable."' Because technology pervades society and most
people have access to smart devices, the total diminution of privacy with
respect to technological advancements is simply unfathomable, albeit from
society's perspective.119
Additionally, the Court has proscribed governmental searches within the
curtilage of a person's home. 2 0 Indeed, the Court's understanding of one's
curtilage is ambiguous at best; however, the Court makes fairly clear that the
concept of curtilage is familiar enough that it is comprehensible from daily
experiences.121 If curtilage entails "the area 'immediately surrounding and
associated with the home"' and remains 'part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes, "'122 it seems likely that the user's expectation of
privacy with respect to each command aimed at the Echo in his home falls
under the protection of the Fourth Amendment.1 23
Listening for or
attempting to access conversations carried out in the user's home, even
conversations converted to data via the Echo, violates the Fourth
Amendment, as well as one's right to privacy, and therefore, constitutes an
117. See Ferguson, supra note 33, at 862 (noting that the Fourth Amendment
"embraces both a preservation of personal autonomy and a protection against arbitrary
or unreasonable intrusions. Whether conceived of as the right to be left alone, or a space
for intimate activities, or other protections of personal autonomy").
118. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("the expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.').
119. See Ferguson, supra note 33, at 807-08 (explaining that the advent of emerging
technologies "poses a problem for a Fourth Amendment protecting 'persons, houses,
papers, and effects' from unreasonable searches and seizures"); see also Bill Wasik Gear,
In The Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED (May 14, 2013,
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2/
(predicting that
"smart," interconnected objects will expand in number, reaching at minimum fifty billion
objects by 2020).
120. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (noting that the right to withdraw in
one's home would be of little value if agents could stand within the curtilage of that home
to obtain evidence).
121. See id. at 4 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cal. v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)) (explaining that the curtilage is an "area around the
home intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically").
122. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6.
123. See Ferguson, supra note 33, at 837-38 (acknowledging that the interception of
non-tangible data poses Fourth Amendment problems, but "[u]nder a reasonable
expectation of privacy test . . .this type of high-acquisition of information" would violate
the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy).
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unreasonable search and seizure.1 24

In addition to the Court's definition of traditional curtilage, the notion of
digital curtilage is particularly important in today's world.1 25 Digital
curtilage requires various factors, including "first, a connection with the
home; second, a claimed and marked space to exclude others . . . and third,
the use of this space which relates to personal or family activities."1 26 Digital
curtilage-a concept that recognizes the advanced nature of today's
technology-embraces the fact that confidential communication can occur
both in one's home and beyond its walls.1 2 7 By expanding the protectability
of the user's electronic communications beyond his home to include areas
where digital information is accessible, digital curtilage enhances the user's
ability to enjoy technology with the same expectation of privacy as in his
home.1 28 Additionally, the notion of digital curtilage provides sufficient
guidance for those seeking the data itself (i.e., government agents),
particularly in instances where third parties are compelled to disclose
seemingly protected information.1 29 Digital curtilage arguably prevents
government agents from over relying on exceptions, such as the SCA's goodfaith exception, in accessing electronic communications, and instead,
compels agents to abide by boundaries, albeit loose ones, established to
protect information otherwise beyond the traditional curtilage of one's
home. 3 0
Furthermore, as indicated above, in Kyllo and In re Google, when
government agents conduct a search utilizing technology generally
unavailable to the public, courts are more inclined to believe that the search

124. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (noting that where advanced
technology not in general public use is used to conduct a search, the search itself is
unreasonable without a warrant); see also In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (implying that advanced
technologies, such as wireless sniffers, pose a threat to one's privacy where information
intended to be confidential is involuntarily shared with a third party).
125. See generally Ferguson, supra note 33, at 809 (proposing the theory of digital
curtilage, a concept born out of the Court's notion of "physical curtilage," to resolve
privacy issues introduced by emerging technologies).
126. Id. at 866
127. Id. ("Traditional curtilage recognizes that while many of our most private
activities take place inside the home, they can also occur beyond the four walls of the
actual homestead . . . [which] also deserves a heightened level of protection.").
128. See id. (noting that digital curtilage should come with a heightened expectation
of privacy akin to physical curtilage).
129. See id. (noting that digital curtilage provides a useful framework for situations
involving technology that implicate the Fourth Amendment).
130. See In re Google Inc. v. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (preventing access to data transmitted over wireless networks).
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itself violates the Fourth Amendment.' 3 ' Regarding the Echo, intercepting
its data transmitted over Wi-Fi requires advanced technology, specifically
highly-technical data collection systems, such as the packet analyzer or
wireless sniffer employed in In re Google.'3 2 As the court in In re Google
acknowledged, the wireless sniffer "secretly captures data packets ... [and
these] data packets are not readable by the general public absent ...
sophisticated decoding and processing technology."' 33 Given the Court's
disdain for governmental searches reliant upon advanced technology not in
general public use, 3 4 searches involving highly-technical data collection
systems, including those capable of intercepting data transmitted via the
Echo, violate the Fourth Amendment as unreasonable searches akin to
physical intrusions.' 35 As such, the Government must possess a warrant to
reasonably intercept, decode, and analyze data transmissions via the Wi-Fi
network in which the Echo device exists.1 3 6
B.
1.

The SCA's Applicability in the Echo Context

Is the Echo an ECS?

To access data electronically stored on the user's Amazon account,
government agents must adhere to the SCA, which requires (1) a warrant,
(2) an administrative subpoena, or (3) a court order pursuant to section
2703(d) of the SCA.1 37 However, as indicated above, the government can
only compel service providers identified as either an ECS or RCS to disclose

131. See id (describing Google's data collection system utilized to collect, decode,
and analyze data transmitted through Wi-Fi); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 33-34 (2001) (noting that a thermal-imaging device was used in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to acquired evidence).
132. See generally In re Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71 (using advanced
technology to access a consumer's Wi-Fi network).
133. Id. at 1071.
134. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 (holding that where the Government uses a device not
in general public use, it has conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
135. See id. (concluding that a thermal-imaging device, one not in general public use,
enabled agents to acquire information that would have been unavailable without a
physical invasion of privacy, and therefore, the search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
136. See id. (indicating that a search reliant on thermal-imaging technology was
unreasonable without a warrant).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012) (noting that compelled disclosure of electronic
information is permitted in certain situations); see also United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Government can access emails with a
warrant, an administrative subpoena, or an SCA-approved court order).
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electronic communications under exceptions included in the SCA.' 3 8 To
classify the Echo as an ECS, the device must enable its user to transmit or
receive wire or electronic communications. 139
The Echo, or more precisely Amazon, is not an ECS for several reasons.
First, the Echo uses, rather than provides, electronic communications with
Amazon. Like In re JetBlue, where the court determined that a website with
mere Internet access and the ability to transmit and receive information to
and from its users did not automatically make the provider an ECS,140
Amazon similarly uses its online platform to advertise goods without acting
an Internet provider, and, as the court in Crowley recognized, the mere fact
that Amazon transmits and receives data to and from its users does not make
it an ECS provider under the SCA.141 Additionally, Amazon, like the
company Andersen Consulting LLP, is a company that purchases Internet
services, rather than providing Internet services, rendering it nothing more
than an ECS-user.1 42

Because Amazon is likely not an ECS, government agents cannot access
information stored on the Echo pursuant to the SCA. Nonetheless, like the
secure website in Konop, Amazon also includes a username and password
component for individuals holding Amazon accounts.1 4 3 As the court in
Konop acknowledged, the "nature of the Internet . . is such that if a user
enters the appropriate information . . . it is nearly impossible to verify the

138. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282 (internal quotations omitted) ("The Stored
Communications Act . . permits a governmental entity to compel a service provider to
disclose the contents of [electronic] communications in certain circumstances."); see also
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that electronic
communications are protected so long as they remain in electronic storage).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15); see also Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1049 (noting that the
SCA covers information stored with the following ECS providers: 1) a phone company;
2) ISPs; or 3) electronic bulletin boards).
140. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that JetBlue does not provide internet access, "just as the use of
a telephone to accept telephone reservations does not transform the company into a
provider of telephone service").
141. See Crowleyv. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
("[The court] rejects the argument that because Amazon receives e-mails from [plaintiff]
it provides an electronic communication service. Additionally, such a definition would
equate a user with a provider .... ).
142. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (citing Andersen
Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998)) (distinguishing
between companies that purchase Internet services and companies that provide Internet
services).
143. See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017); see also
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While most
websites are public, many, such as Konop's, are restricted. For instance, some websites
are password-protected .... ).
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true identity of that user."1 44 Notwithstanding this concern, data transmitted
by the Echo qualifies as electronic communication under section 2510(12)
of the Wiretap Act.1 4 5 Therefore, as indicated by the court in Konop, any
interception, or "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device, 146 acquired during transmission violates the Wiretap Act.1 47 As
such, should a court conclude that Amazon is an ECS, government actors
seeking to intercept data transmitted as electronic communication through
the Echo cannot do so during transmission without running afoul of the
Wiretap Act.1 48
2.

Is the Echo an RCS?

The Echo is also likely not an RCS provider simply because it relates to
Amazon's website. Again, to qualify as an RCS provider, the data
transmitted by the Echo must be available to the public and not the product
of a special relationship, such as an employer-employee relationship.1 49
Amazon's website qualifies as publically available because it is available to
any member of the general population who complies with requisite
procedures.15 0

Nevertheless, Amazon's website, with respect to Echo users, is the
product of a special relationship between the Echo, or Amazon generally,
and its user. Therefore, Amazon is not an RCS in the Echo context. Using
Andersen Consulting LLP as an example, where the court found that mere
144. Konop, 302 F.3d at 875.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (noting that electronic communication entails
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted by a "wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical [sic] system"); see also Konop, 302 F.3d at 876 (noting
that Konop's website fits the definition of electronic communication because information
is transferred from the website to the user through one the mediums specified in the
Wiretap Act).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
147. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876, 878 (noting that Congress intended the definition of
"Intercept" to be narrow).
148. See id. at 878 (noting that website interception violates the Wiretap Act if it
occurs during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage). But see Crispin v.
Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that ECS
providers, under the SCA, may not "knowingly divulg[e] to any person or entity the
contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service").
149. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(16); 2711(2); Andersen Consulting LLP v.
UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that simply providing an
employee access to the company's email system does not equate to providing email
services to the public).
150. See ECPA Definitions, CYBER TELECOM (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.cybertele
com.org/security/ecpanutshell.htm.
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access to an employer's internal email system (i.e., its database) did not
constitute the employer as an RCS provider, the relationship between
Amazon and Echo users is better understood. 5 ' A special relationship
between a site and its users, as noted by the court in that case, undermines
publicly available services, even if said site is available to the public atlarge.1 5 2 With respect to Amazon and Echo users, the mere fact that
Amazon's site offers public services, namely in the form of ordering
goods,1 53 the Echo, likely operated within the confines of one's home, is
privately maintained. Specifically, when the user commands his Echo, such
commands are likely made pursuant to a reasonable expectation of
privacy,1 5 4 and as such, a court would likely find that the commands (i.e.,
speech) are unavailable to the public and the product of a special relationship
between the user and Amazon by way of the Echo, undermining the
argument that Amazon is an RCS provider. 5 5
IV. MODIFYING CURRENT LAWS TO ENCOMPASS EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY

To keep up with technological advancements, it is essential to modify the
Fourth Amendment, the third-party doctrine, and the SCA.
Such
modifications are necessary to ensure that Amazon is not forced to divulge
confidential information transmitted through the Echo.1 56 With respect to
the third party doctrine, should government agents request data transmitted
by the Echo and/or stored on the user's Amazon account, courts should
remove third parties from the SCA's purview entirely. 15 Although Warshak
held that government agents can acquire information under the SCA despite
violating the Fourth Amendment, the SCA's good faith exception does not
comport with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 5
In holding that the
SCA's good faith exception might trump the Fourth Amendment, namely a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy, the court in Warshak
151. See Andersen Consulting LLP, 991 F. Supp. at 1043.
152. See id. at 1042.
153. See also id. at 1041.
154. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy .... ).
155. See Andersen Consulting LLP, 991 F. Supp. at 1043 (finding special relationships cannot constitute an RCS).
156. See Tsukayama, supra note 15.

157. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 292 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that the
contents of one's emails, stored with an ISP, are accessible pursuant to the SCA even if
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
158. See id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 33, at 870 (noting that a better definition
of digital curtilage could refine what government intrusion means should Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence creep into technological issues).
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unnecessarily complicated an already complex problem. 5 9
Additionally, to protect confidential electronic communications from third
parties, the third-party doctrine must be modified.1 60 Because roughly eighty
percent of Americans rely on the Internet,161 it is simply unreasonable to
maintain the third-party doctrine in its current form.1 62 To counteract this
problem, courts should implement a categorization requirement for the thirdparty doctrine itself.1 63
In doing so, courts should implement a
reasonableness test before admitting information under the third-party
doctrine, wherein government agents must demonstrate that there was at
least a reasonable suspicion that information could be obtained from the third
party in a reasonable manner.1 64
Additionally, Congress should amend the SCA to include data stored via
a voice command center, such as the Echo. Absent such a revision, the SCA,
as it currently reads, does not adequately protect a vast majority of emerging
technologies, including voice command centers, from governmental
intrusion.1 65 Additionally, Congress should expand the SCA to include more
than merely ECS and RCS providers to include protections for electronic
communication involuntarily shared with third parties.1 6 6 Further, Congress
should articulate what constitutes online communication and whether the
SCA applies to online communication through the current RCS or ECS
definitions-if at all.1 6 7 There is currently no consistent or universal
understanding of what technological or online communicating means,

159. See Smith, supra note 1 (noting that the Echo is a "ticking constitutional time

bomb").
160. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-20 (2012).
161. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the FourthAmendment, 96 IOWA L. REv. 58 1,

588 (2011).
162. See id. at 581 (noting that the controversial third-party doctrine has become
"increasingly problematic in an age where a large proportion of personal
communications and transactions are carried out over the Internet").
163. See Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 52, at 1003 (identifying certain categories
of information that are particularly ripe for exemption from the third-party doctrine).
164. See id. at 1034 (depicting a test where first, an officer can point to reasonable
suspicion that the search of the third party will turn up relevant information and, second,
the search should be reasonable).
165. See William Jeremy Robinson, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1235 (2010) ("The
SCA already provides some quantum of privacy in online communications and content,
but as society embraces new technologies, including cloud computing, the balance of the
[SCA] struck more than two decades ago may no longer be appropriate.").

166. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2012); see also Medina, supra note 75, at 277.
167. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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particularly with respect to the Echo.' 68 To that end, without additional
clarification from either Congress or the judiciary, albeit both, it is unclear
whether the Echo would be defined as an ECS, RCS, or nothing at all.' 69
V. CONCLUSION

The advent of smart technology has created several social and legal
dilemmas. Given the popularity of smart devices, smartphones, computers,
and voice command centers alike, the majority of people using them
presumably do not understand the sacrifice to privacy incurred by way of
smart technology. Additionally, the law has repeatedly failed to keep up
with the rapid pace of this evolving technology. As such, it is essential, as
argued above, to expand the SCA to encompass emerging technologies, such
as voice command centers (i.e., the Echo), to modernize Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence surrounding the third-party doctrine, and to expand the term
"curtilage" to include digital forms of communication in the Fourth
Amendment context. Doing so ensures that the privacy expectations of each
consumer are upheld in an ever-shrinking world.

168. See O'Boyle, supra note 4 (noting that when the Echo permits a person to order
items, it effectively creates an in-the-air billboard: if the user knows what he or she is
buying, the advertisement stands).
169. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868 (9th Cir. 2002)
(confirming an employee's private, personal website as an ECS), and Becker v. Toca,
No. 07-7202, 2008 WL 4443050, at *1, *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2008) (permitting
classification of an online business or retailer as an ECS provider if the business operates
a website offering customers the ability to send and receive electronic communications
with third parties), with Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1263
(N.D. Cal. 2001), and United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that a home computer, merely connected to the Internet, is not an ECS).

